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The concept of human nature has always been an important issue, be it for philosophy, 
sciences or politics. In the 20th century, it has been severely criticized. From a scientific 
perspective, the concept of human nature has been criticized for relying on an outdated 
essentialism and a misguided nature-nurture divide. From a social perspective, it has 
been criticized since it furthers dehumanization, as part of which some people are 
regarded as less human.  
This book takes these criticisms seriously and asks: What could it possibly 
mean to talk about a ‘human nature’ despite these critiques? 
Ultimate goal 
The ultimate goal of the book is revisionary. It aims at a constructive philosophical 
account of the perennial concept that humans have a ‘nature’. Taking the above-
mentioned criticisms into account, it aims to makes sense of four core aspects of the 
concept of human nature, namely species-specificity, typicality, fixity, and normalcy.  
The resulting revisionary account of ‘human nature’ minimizes 
dehumanization and does not fall back to outdated biological knowledge about 
evolution, kind essentialism, and the nature-nurture divide. The account is post-
essentialist since it eliminates the concept of an essence. It is pluralist since it defends 
that there are – in the world – different things that correspond to three different post-
essentialist concepts. It is interactive since nature and culture are understood as 
interacting at the developmental, epigenetic and evolutionary level and since humans 
are shown to create their nature via explanatory and classificatory looping effects. 
Approach 
Since issues about outdated biological knowledge pertain to philosophy of science, this 
book is written from a philosophy of science perspective, but one that also takes the 
intricate connections between science and society into account, in order to bring 
dehumanization and normalcy in focus too.  
The book includes five analytic layers: analyzing (a) the content, (b) the 
ontological status, (c) the epistemic roles, (d) the pragmatic functions, and (e) the 
essential contestedness of the concept that human beings have a ‘nature’. Content 
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concerns which traits belong to human nature (e.g., whether rationality, the opposable 
thumb, etc., are part of human nature or not). Ontological status specifies whether 
human nature exists as something real, out there in the world. Epistemic roles specify 
whether the concept is used for classification, description, or explanation. Pragmatic 
functions specify why people care for the respective knowledge about human nature. 
Essential contestedness shows why it is unlikely that there will ever be an agreement in 
a society with respect to the content of the concept. The focus of the book is on (b)-(e).  
 
Outline 
The book contains three parts. It starts with an introduction of the analytic layers (a)-
(e), basic assumptions about the expression ‘nature’, and assumptions about the 
expression ‘human’. After that, the post-essentialist, interactive and pluralistic 
direction of argumentation is introduced.  
In Part I, the book distinguishes and discusses three specific challenges that the 
concept of human nature faces. It is shown that, in a vernacular context, talk about 
‘human nature’ leads to ethically unjustified dehumanization of people that are 
considered as being not fully human. This is called the dehumanization challenge. It is 
claimed that it is (d) the pragmatic function and not (a) the content that allows to 
understand the vernacular concept of human nature with its dehumanizing effects. As 
a scientific concept, ‘human nature’ has so far often relied on an essentialism that 
Darwinian evolutionary thinking shows to be wrong. This is labeled as the Darwinian 
challenge. A third challenge, the developmentalist challenge results from wrong 
assumptions about the nature-nurture divide that result in misguided claims that traits 
of humans are ‘due to nature’ alone, rather than due to the interaction between nature 
and nurture. The Darwinian and the developmentalist challenge mainly address (c) the 
epistemic roles of the concept.  
The question that becomes pertinent in Part II is then: what’s left of human 
nature, given these challenges? Can science maintain a concept of human nature that 
prevents dehumanization as much as possible and that does not rely on outdated 
essentialism or outdated beliefs regarding the nature-nurture divide? Different 
revisionary proposals in the contemporary literature will be compared and the 
respective pros-and-cons discussed, given (c) the different epistemic roles of the 
concept. The core thesis of this constructive part is best captured by a slogan: human 
nature in the traditional, essentialist sense is dead, long live human natures – in a post-
essentialist, interactive and pluralist sense. This entails a realistic conclusion clarifying (b), 
the status of the resulting concepts: indeed, there are phenomena in the world that can 
legitimately be called a human ‘nature’. Yet, different disciplines are in need of 
different kinds of post-essentialist, interactive concepts of human nature. Some 
disciplines will go for a classificatory concept, some for a descriptive concept, and 
some for an explanatory concept of human nature. Each of these concepts rescues 
different aspects of the outdated essentialist concept of human nature. Other 
revisionary proposals in the literature on human nature are too monistic since they 
exclusively defend either a classificatory, or a descriptive or an explanatory concept – as 
if there can be only one successful replacement of the essentialist, dualistic concept. By 
being pluralist rather than monistic, this book not only allows to regard a classificatory, 
a descriptive and an explanatory concept of a human nature as epistemically and 
ontologically on a par; it also solves problems other revisionary proposals have with 
respect to the concept these defend, e.g. how to interpret the typicality or fixity of 
human nature.  
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Part III addresses a couple of normative issues. The (d) pragmatic functions of 
using the concept come into focus again and (e) the essential contestedness of the 
concept is established. At issue is, first, what remains of the normative, emancipatory 
humanism that stands behind ideas, such as human rights, global justice, etc., given the 
pluralist, interactive and post-essentialist picture developed in Part II? Second, how 
should we talk about humans in order to prevent falling back to dehumanizing, 
essentialist thinking? Even if appropriately revised concepts are possible, it might still 
be argued that the term ‘human nature’ should be prevented as much as possible – to 
minimize dehumanization as much as possible. In reply to these questions, Part III 
defends three core claims: first, nothing in the post-essentialist, interactive and pluralist 
picture conflicts with a normative, emancipatory humanism; second, human nature is 
an essentially contested concept that will dialectically change with the people using it; 
third, we should indeed eliminate the language of human nature.  
In sum: Part I is critical, Part II is focused on science and constructive, Part III 
connects results from Part II back to society and adds an eliminative finish.  
 
 
Scope, relevance, intended audience, etc. 
Scope 
The book covers a debate in philosophy of science that started roughly in the 1980s and 
gained momentum recently. It nonetheless transgresses the boundary towards moral 
and political philosophy, mainly with respect to issues connected with dehumanization 
and human rights.  
The scope with respect to sciences covered is general – including all sciences 
concerned with humans (sciences understood in the broad sense that includes 
humanities). Nonetheless, the book is anchored in the life sciences since ‘human’ is 
mainly (but not exclusively) taken to refer to the species Homo sapiens.   
 
This book is unique in approach and scope:  
- It has an analytic approach that distinguishes five layers of analysis and 
offers an in-depth analysis with a focus on the last four layers.  
- It covers three contemporary main challenges simultaneously: the 
developmentalist challenge together with the Darwinian challenge and 
the dehumanization challenge.  
- It offers a constructive-revisionary answer that keeps the balance 
between revision and elimination.  
- It connects sciences and society, facts and values.   
Relevance 
Human nature is an intricate topic in the midst of a web of issues (e.g., evolution, 
heredity, essentialism, animal/human, variation, naturalness, enhancement, moral 
standing, racism, sexism, normalcy and flourishing) that transgress the usual 
boundaries between philosophy, sciences and politics. It is a perennial and ‘hot’ topic 
that attracts a lot of popular writing. If an idea is so entrenched and at the same time so 
much discussed, it is the task of philosophical analysis to raise the level of discourse in 
order to make an informed discussion possible that prevents the extremes that 
dominate popular discussions as well as paper-length interventions. Given the state of 
the art, only an in-depth coverage in book-length allows for a bigger picture that charts 
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the midway between scientifically outdated thinking about human nature and 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater.  
Intended audience 
The book is written from a philosophical perspective but not for philosophers 
exclusively. It should be of interest to academic scholars from the humanities, social 
sciences and the life sciences, as well as for the educated lay reader. For the experts 
from philosophy of science, Part I will be rather expository, but since the book is 
constructed in a modular manner, experts in philosophy of the life sciences can easily 





The topic is presented as including five analytic layers of discussing the concept of 
human nature: content, status, epistemic roles, pragmatic functions, essential 
contestedness. The three parts are introduced.  
 
Introduction  
Ch. 1. What’s at issue  
The introduction starts with some basic assumptions that concern the meanings of the 
term ‘nature’ and four aspects that reoccur with respect to concepts of human nature: 
specificity, typicality, fixity and normalcy. On that basis, a family resemblance of 
different concepts of human nature is postulated. After that, the connection to issues of 
the philosophy of the life sciences is introduced by justifying that the term ‘human’ 
either refers to a biological group category (e.g., Homo sapiens), labeled as ‘humankind,’ 
or to a socially specified group, labeled as ‘humanity’. The two groups – humankind 
and humanity – are then presented as distinct but overlapping. It is made clear that the 
book mainly concerns humankind and that humanity is then addressed in Part III. 
Given the assumptions made and given the distinction between three different 
epistemic roles (classification, description and explanation), it is outlined how the 
account will ultimately defend that there are in the world – for each kind of group – 
three natures: a classificatory nature, a descriptive nature and an explanatory nature. 
The pluralism in this rests on the claim that different disciplines will utilize a different 
concept to say something salient about humans. The chapter ends with a brief 
justification why a fourth, i.e., a normative concept of a human nature, is decoupled 
from the post-essentialist, pluralist and interactive scientific picture that will be 
developed in Part II.  
 
 
Part I: Three challenges  
This part analyzes three standard challenges that the concept of a human nature faces 
in contemporary debates between science, philosophy and politics.  
 
Ch. 2. The dehumanization challenge  
Human nature is a concept that exists not only in science but also in society. In social 
contexts, it has a couple of pragmatic functions. One is dehumanization: some people 
are regarded as less human because they are less realizing human nature. By 
introducing dehumanization in a systematic manner, illustrated by a few examples, 
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mainly with respect to sexism and racism, the aim of this Chapter is to show that the 
vernacular concept of human nature is purely functional and socially perspectival: the 
content is exchangeable, but the function (to be used for dehumanization) remains the 
same; the content varies with the perspective of those who speak, i.e., those who regard 
themselves as human, and others as less human. On the basis of this, it is established 
that dehumanization is stronger if it combines with an essentialist concept of human 
nature. The dehumanization challenge is thus twofold: from the scientific point of 
view, the social perspectivalism in the vernacular concept needs to be overcome, to 
arrive at an objective concept of human nature. From the social point of view, 
dehumanization itself is the challenge: it needs to be overcome because it conflicts with 
basic ideas about equality, human rights and justice. Given that normalcy assumptions 
and essentialism make dehumanization stronger, the challenge becomes one of 
minimizing dehumanization as much as possible by getting rid of the normalcy 
assumptions and essentialism.  
 
Ch. 3. The Darwinian challenge  
Essentialism is challenged not only because of dehumanization. Within science, human 
nature has traditionally been conceptualized in an essentialist manner: a nature of a 
species is its essence. An essence is introduced as simultaneously playing a 
classificatory, an explanatory, and a descriptive-predictive epistemic role. After 
introducing the connection between essentialism, natural kinds and biological species, 
the Chapter reconstructs the anti-essentialist consensus in contemporary philosophy of 
the life sciences, a consensus that is based on the consequences of a Darwinian 
evolutionary theory, mainly with respect to the definitional role of an essence and with 
respect to the explanatory role of an essence. It is shown that, given Darwinian 
ontology, there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in a 
biological species (fulfilling the classificatory role of an essence) that are at the same 
time (as required from an essence) fulfilling an explanatory role for the traits that are 
characteristic of the kind. This is the core of the Darwinian challenge. Given that 
biological species, such as humankind, do – according to the anti-essentialist consensus 
– not have essences in the traditional senses, the Darwinian challenge is ultimately to 
specify what’s left of the concept of a nature of humankind if essentialism is eliminated.  
 
Ch. 4. The developmentalist challenge  
A third, developmentalist challenge against the concept of human nature stems from 
critiques of understanding ontogenetic development in a dualistic manner. It criticizes 
attitudes that regard phenotypic traits as being exclusively or predominantly ‘due to 
nature’ or ‘due to nurture’. The Chapter introduces the nature-nurture divide by 
comparing its meaning and role in Greek antiquity with the so-called ‘hardening’ of 
the divide in the 19th century. That allows to show that ‘nature’ in such contexts means 
‘biologically inherited developmental resources’. On that basis, the Chapter defends 
that it was again a Darwinian way of thinking, this time the Neo-Darwinian anti-
Lamarckism, which changed the way life is explained in a significant way. It gave rise 
to the modern nature-nurture divide, which includes a hardening of the divide that 
assumed that the causality between nature and nurture (or nature and culture) can be 
apportioned – so that traits can be said to be ‘due to nature’, or ‘due to nurture’. The 
developmentalist challenge is an attack against that hardening. The claim is that the 
interaction between nature and nurture is so strong that an apportioning is not 
adequate – at the level of development (which is regarded as core level), at the level of 
epigenetic inheritance and at the level of comparing biological and cultural evolution. 
After introducing the so-called interactionist consensus, i.e., what is widely shared 
 6 
about the mentioned interactions, the Chapter outlines what is controversial about it, 
to better see what results form it as a challenge for the concept of a human nature.  
 
 
Part II: A post-essentialist, pluralist and interactive account  
This part tries to rescue as much as possible from the battlefield. It is the core 
constructive part of the book. It takes the Darwinian challenge and the 
developmentalist challenge into account and develops from it a post-essentialist, 
pluralist and interactive account of different concepts of human nature. Each post-
essentialist concept fulfills only one epistemic role (i.e., classification, description, or 
explanation), whereas the essentialist account had an essence fulfilling more than one 
epistemic role.  
 
Ch. 5. Genealogy, the classificatory nature and channels of inheritance  
This Chapter starts with five distinct traditional questions regarding a species’ nature. 
It defends that given contemporary species concepts in evolutionary thinking, 
genealogy (ancestor-descendant relationships) is important for all five questions. On 
the basis of this, the claim is that genealogy grounds a classificatory nature of 
biological species, a claim that already David Hull made. Since species depend on 
homeostasis (i.e., mechanisms that guarantee stability over time), the different so-
called channels of inheritance are compared with respect to their dynamic properties, 
i.e., with respect to how much stability they contribute. The claim with respect to that 
is that biological reproduction conveys a special stability of developmental resources, 
which is key for the homeostasis of a species. In a further step, the importance of 
genealogy (and the respective channel of biological inheritance) for explaining the 
development of typical traits of a species is outlined. The claim is: genealogy is 
indirectly, partly and non-specifically relevant for explaining the respective life form of 
a species because it is at the foundation of the channel of inheritance that guarantees a 
high stability. After that, the pluralism of three natures is introduced. The chapter ends 
with a historical and social contextualization of the importance of genealogy.  
 
Ch. 6. Towards a descriptive human nature  
After discussing why sciences need a concept of a descriptive nature, that concept is 
decoupled from the classificatory and the explanatory nature. Given that even the 
severest critics of the concept of human nature leave a version of the descriptive 
concept alive, disagreements in the current literature about the details of how to 
specify it exactly are addressed. The chapter first discusses what typicality actually 
means. Connected with that, it addresses whether typicality is necessary, given that 
species show polymorphisms (such as sex-specific traits). Are these part of the nature 
of a species? This question leads to an important issue about abstraction since – as I 
shall argue – via abstraction almost any trait can be made typical. Finally, various 
further qualifiers are discussed since typicality alone turns out to be not sufficient to 
have a descriptive concept of human nature that is narrow enough, i.e., sufficient to 
exclude habits such as ‘to bury the dead’ or ‘to carry cell phones’ as being not part of 
human nature. What is added to typicality, however, is presented as depending on 
disciplinary interest and similar perspectives. Yet, fixity of traits is a frequently 
recurring qualifier, at least in the scientific context of understanding evolution, 
heredity and development.  
 
Ch. 7. The stability of human nature  
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This chapter explicates the alleged fixity of human nature as stability. Often, fixity is 
interpreted as innateness, but innateness looks at the developmental level only and is 
as contested as human nature, mainly because of the developmental challenge. 
Innateness is thus dismissed as an answer to the question what fixity of human nature 
means. It neither helps to solve the developmentalist challenge nor is it a concept that 
includes an evolutionary level of description and explanation. The next proposal that is 
reviewed is that one needs to add evolvedness (rather than innateness) to typicality: if 
a trait is typical and evolved, it is part of human nature. Even though this proposal, 
mainly defended by Edouard Machery, is on the right track, it is dismissed since it is 
still too broad, mainly because culture can evolve too. What is valuable about the 
proposal is that it points at the temporal dimension of a species’ descriptive nature. 
The claim that is defended on the basis of this is that populations of individual 
organisms show typicality (similarity) not only in space (synchronically) but also over 
time (diachronically). The similarity over time is what I call stability. Given that there is 
a specific channel of inheritance, the biological channel (as introduced in Ch. 5), which 
is reliably providing a high stability, human nature in the descriptive sense is 
reconstructed as traits that are typical and reliably reoccur over time because of 
developmental resources that travel the channel of biological inheritance. Since this 
seems to directly fly in the face of the interactionist consensus, it is discussed how it is 
possible to claim that a trait is (in that sense) ‘due to nature’. Abstraction is a central 
part of the reply.   
 
Ch. 8. An explanatory nature  
The descriptive nature has an explanatory counterpart. Human nature in the 
explanatory sense refers to those developmental resources that are typical and 
biologically inherited. To defend that claim two revisionary essentialist proposals – 
dubbed ‘developmental essentialism’ and ‘teleological essentialism’ – are reviewed and 
dismissed. These proposals claim to rescue an essentialist explanatory concept of 
human nature. The aim of these ‘new’ essentialisms is to prevent the problems of the 
traditional essentialism by utilizing the explanatory role of essences only. The claim 
against these essentialist proposals is that they both suffer from an intrinsicality bias. 
They are too dependent on the assumption that an explanatory nature needs to be 
internal to individual organisms. The suggestion is then to re-conceptualize the 
explanatory nature as being internal to a population, rather than to the individual 
organisms. The explanatory nature of humans is then specified as a population-level 
pool of developmental resources that travel the biological channel of inheritance. This 
populational explanatory nature is perfectly compatible with the demands that come 
from the Darwinian as well as the developmentalist challenge.   
 
Ch. 9. Causal selection and how human nature is made thereby 
Explaining human traits involves, as all explanations, an epistemic choice: some causal 
factors are ignored, while others are selected to be included in an explanation. The 
Chapter introduces an approach to causal selection that shows how normative stances 
(preferences and values) make causes first visible and then real: how our normative 
stances and values bias us towards certain kinds of explanations (e.g., explanations 
pointing to human nature) and how such explanatory endeavors – via explanatory 
looping effects – make the selected causes real. That way, the chapter can show that 
human nature in the explanatory and descriptive sense is not only interactive in the 
sense that nature and culture interact at the developmental, intergenerational and 
evolutionary level, as described in the standard critique summarized under the label 
‘developmental challenge’. Human nature is also interactive in the sense of an 
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explanatory looping effect: when one gives explanations of human life that point to 
human nature, this can influence humans in their behavior. Depending on whether 
people move ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the explanation, this stabilizes or changes human nature 
over time. This is how humans make human nature.  
 
 
Part III: Normativity, essential contestedness and the quest for elimination  
The reconstruction of an objective scientific picture of human nature that is post-
essentialist, pluralist, and interactive in Part II does not reconstruct the normativity 
that is traditionally attached to the vernacular concept of human nature. It also ignores 
that the vernacular concept often refers to social rather than biological groups and 
what follows for use of human nature talk from the dehumanization challenge. These 
three topics are dealt with in this final part III.   
 
Ch. 10. Humanism and normativity  
Humanism is introduced as a view that insists that all humans are equal, subject to 
human rights and norms of justice. This clearly involves normative evaluations about 
how humans should live, i.e., how humans flourish. Where is all that normativity gone 
to, if it is not anymore part of the post-essentialist, pluralist and interactive account of 
human nature in the scientific, objective sense? After discussing the issue of moral 
standing (who belongs to the group of individuals that count for certain moral 
considerations), the Chapter discusses how the descriptive nature (as reconstructed in 
this book) can be of ethical importance to fix what is needed for human flourishing. 
This is then combined with the results of Ch. 9, leading to a dialectical concept of an 
ever-changing descriptive and explanatory ‘looping’ human nature. Finally, this 
dialectic concept is interpreted as an essentially contested concept: agreement on the 
content of an essentially contested concept is unlikely since it is essential to the concept 
to be contested.  
 
Ch. 11. Should we eliminate the expression ‘human nature’?  
The final Chapter asks whether we should eliminate the term ‘human nature’. Part II 
defended that there are post-essentialist, interactive concepts of human nature that are 
here to stay. Yet, the pluralism defended also means that the term ‘human nature’ has 
become ambiguous and redundant for describing the matters of facts scientists want to 
describe with the term ‘human nature’. In addition, the risk of social harm following 
from using the expression ‘human nature’ is high, given the insights on 
dehumanization from Ch. 2. Even the post-essentialist human natures (the descriptive, 
explanatory and classificatory nature) can lead to dehumanization. On the basis of this 
and the insights from Part I and II, the Chapter shows that there are three balancing 
problems involved if one wants to decide whether the term ‘human nature’ should be 
prevented, given the post-essentialist, pluralist and interactive account. These 
balancing problems involve epistemic values that relate to the epistemic roles, as well 
as social values that relate to the pragmatic functions of the concept. Taken together, 
they lead to important trade-offs of values and consequences that allow to apply a 
precautionary principle. This then shifts the balance towards eliminating the language 
of ‘human nature’ from discourses in science as well as society. The concepts can stay, 
but the terminology should be prevented as much as possible.  
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